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Might economists be partly to blame for Trump and moves towards a
‘full British Brexit’?
The reasons for the Trump phenomenon and Brexit vote are many and various, but
have we overlooked ways in which standard economics, by failing to take seriously
the radical uncertainty endemic in modern political economies, has contributed to the
populist turn? Richard Bronk argues that by mischaracterising their profession as
able to make precise forecasts of uncertain futures – an impossible task –
economists contributed to the current denigration of experts. More importantly, by
assuming that people form rational expectations, they encouraged us to ignore the transformative
power of simple narratives.
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Economists notoriously disagree among themselves both at the level of analysis and in the
normative and political positions they take. But, while it is possible to find economists who believe
that Brexit might boost UK productivity and growth – thanks to increased possibilities for
deregulation and new trade deals – the majority believe it will be extremely difficult to compensate
for the loss of full access to the EU single market and the disruption of intra-EU supply chains by
entering into new trade agreements with China, India, and an increasingly protectionist USA.
Likewise, few serious economists argue in favour of Trump’s zero-sum game view of trade and
believe that the USA can emerge unhurt from a trade war. So how does it make sense to hold
economics as a discipline partly responsible for Trump’s populist policies, for the UK flirting with
what Boris Johnson calls a ‘full British Brexit’, and perhaps more widely for the populist turn in Italy
and elsewhere?
I argue that deep in the microfoundations of standard economics – and therefore in the intellectual
DNA of most economists – lie three almost universally held and closely related assumptions that
have, indirectly, had profound effects on contemporary politics. The first is the belief the future can
be predicted, at least in probabilistic terms, with the help of good models and sufficient data on the
past. The second is that radical uncertainty – as opposed to the sort of ‘risk’ amenable to objective
probability functions – is, in practical terms, of little importance. The third is that, over time,
economic and political actors will converge on rational expectations – that is, they will tend to
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internalise correct models of how the economy works and avoid systematic errors in their
forecasting because they would otherwise lose out in competitive markets to people with more
rational expectations.
In a new book, Uncertain Futures: Imaginaries, Narratives, and Calculation in the Economy, Jens
Beckert and I argue that all three of these assumptions are highly questionable. We argue that
dynamic capitalist economies are characterised by relentless innovation and novelty and hence
exhibit an indeterminacy that cannot be reduced to measurable risk and objective probability
functions. In such conditions of radical uncertainty, there is no objective future already ‘out there’
on which the expectations of rational actors can readily converge. Instead, the future is still to be
created by how the various actors interacting with each other imagine and wish it to be. Faced
with uncertainty, economic actors have no choice but to combine hard-headed calculation with
imaginaries and social narratives to form fictional expectations that coordinate action and provide
the confidence to act.
The various contributors to Uncertain Futures examine how economic actors form expectations
and make decisions despite the high level of uncertainty they face. The book demonstrates how
grand narratives, central bank forward guidance, economic forecasts, finance models, business
plans, visions of technological futures, and new era stories influence behaviour and become
instruments of power in markets and societies; and it argues that the market impact of shared
calculative devices, social narratives, and contingent imaginaries underlines the rationale for a
new form of narrative economics. Particular attention is paid to how central banks expend huge
efforts on crafting messages that can channel expectations and influence behaviour in a desired
direction, while using conversation to glean the stories that are motivating other actors.
So why might themes from a specialist economics book that only tangentially covers the dynamics
of politics have relevance for understanding the spread of populism? I argue they do so for two
reasons:
First, the failure of standard economics to acknowledge the impossibility of prediction and
objective probabilities in dynamic economic and political settings where high levels of product,
technology, and policy innovation cause radical uncertainty has led the discipline (and those using
it in support of public policy) to set up a false standard for judging the value of economists’
expertise. The value of economic analysis is not for use as some modern-day equivalent of
consulting the tea leaves or the Delphic oracle to learn what precisely Fate has in store for us.
Rather economic models are valuable in helping us discern the causal mechanisms at play and
simulate how crossing key economic thresholds might lead to sharp changes in trend. Economic
models are vital diagnostic tools that improve our ability to spot emerging patterns and understand
general economic tendencies.
By ignoring this and allowing their own expertise to be mischaracterised as divining the future with
precision, economists unwittingly contributed to contemporary cynicism about the role of experts.
As one forecast after another was proven ‘wrong’ as a point forecast, the credibility of economic
expertise suffered and the great strides that the discipline has made in analysing key causal
mechanisms became increasingly ignored.
In the case of Brexit, for example, it was easy to ridicule official attempts to forecast the exact
impact over one year of a vote for Brexit. The mistaken emphasis in official Treasury and other
forecasts on predicting precisely a future that the public correctly understood was highly uncertain
helped those who wished to denigrate the analysis and advice of experts as ‘fake news’ or ‘Project
Fear’. This may prove to have tragic consequences since it appears increasingly clear that the
majority of economic forecasters were in fact correct in their broad assessments of the likely
implications of Brexit for sterling, real wages, investment and long-term growth rates, as the Bank
of England Governor and the Centre for European Reform have recently observed.
There is a deeper sense in which the widespread tendency in economics to downplay the
importance of uncertainty has contributed to current political trends. A whole generation of elites
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has been trained to assume that voters and economic actors will tend – despite certain predictable
behavioural biases – to converge on rational expectations and internalise the best available model
of how the economy works. In a world of stable parameters and given preferences, with little or no
product or policy innovation – where history is a good guide to the future – this assumption might
be perfectly valid. Competitive forces would tend to favour those who rationally use the evidence
available and calculate probabilities correctly. In such circumstances, it would be as unwise as it is
offensive to assume voter irrationality.
The situation is, however, completely different in conditions of radical uncertainty – where rampant
innovation and complex global interdependencies make the future highly indeterminate. In such
circumstances, the expectations of voters and economic actors cannot be anchored in pre-existing
probability functions; instead, their expectations relate to a future that is yet to be created by the
choices and innovations that they and others will make. The crucial political implication of this is
clear: once you accept that there is no uniquely rational or optimal set of expectations in any
uncertain situation, then it follows that the set of expectations and narratives most likely to
determine the political future by structuring decisions is likely to be as much a function of
rhetorical, market, or political power as of available factual evidence or data.
In Uncertain Futures, Robert Boyer and David Tuckett argue that the greater the level of
uncertainty the more key economic actors must rely on often simple narratives to guide their
expectations and behaviour and make sense of the world. This is a lesson that (intuitively or
otherwise) Trump, Johnson, Farage and other populists have learned. When the world is unstable
and the future uncertain, people crave simple narratives about fantastic futures that can orient
their expectations and give them the confidence to act despite the uncertainty they face. And since
narratives tend – at least until their weaknesses are exposed – to create a future in their own
image so long as sufficient numbers of people adopt them, the immediate future belongs to those
who craft the most persuasive narrative while rubbishing all analytical challenges to the imagined
future they conjure up. In a world of uncertain futures, economic and political outcomes are partly
determined by those who have the market, political, or rhetorical power to make their visions,
stories, and expectations count.
Those who want to fight populist attempts to mislead the public with simplistic imaginaries of
making one’s country great again which ignore well-established causal mechanisms need to
understand the transforming power of imaginaries, narratives, and stories in modern capitalist
societies. There remains a key role for expert judgement and reason in discerning more or less
plausible (or ethically acceptable) political imaginaries and narratives. But anti-populists cannot
rely on reason, evidence, and calculation alone to win back the argument. They also need to learn
to craft narratives and imaginaries that are rhetorically persuasive and emotionally appealing, as
well as backed up by the best understanding available of the physical and economic constraints
faced. The political and economic future of our societies will depend on the ability of political
leaders to harness imagination, rhetoric, and reason to craft narratives that can guide us to create
a better society for all our children.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
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